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1971:  A STRATEGIC ‘VIJAY’ POWERED BY OUTSTANDING STATECRAFT

By Group Captain Praveer Purohit (retd)

Fifty-two years ago, on 16 December, the map of South Asia changed forever when Lieutenant General A A K Niazi of the Pakistan Army signed the Instrument of Surrender at Dacca. This ended the two-week Indo-Pakistan war, and a new nation, Bangladesh, was born. Ranked as the most comprehensive and decisive victory since the Second World War, Bangladesh’s birth resulted from a long-drawn struggle centering on basic human rights, the desire to live with dignity and political equality. Pakistani intransigence and an ingrained sense of Punjabi superiority made Yahya Khan and his regime blind to the genuine and just aspirations of the Bengalis in what was then East Pakistan. Treating the December 1970 Pakistan general election result with disdain, Yahya instead unleashed one of the worst human rights violations in modern history through a brutal repression of the hapless Bengalis. Millions died, women suffered some of the most heinous crimes, and India had to bear the influx of almost 10 million refugees, fleeing the genocide of the Pakistani forces.

The 1971 war and India’s preceding actions testified to the Indian leadership’s strategic thinking moulded in the Kautilyan framework. The Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, was justifiably concerned over the human rights violations in East Pakistan and the consequent stress on India’s economy due to the refugees. At the strategic level, she read the situation correctly. Even as she made immense diplomatic efforts to resolve the issue, she was realistic enough to direct the Army, Navy, and IAF to prepare for the worst. India’s external intelligence agency, the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), was in its infancy (it was formed in 1968), yet was in the thick of action, gathering, collating and deriving high-quality intelligence. Domestically, the nation was being prepared for the possibility of a war. Inter-ministry and inter-service coordination and cooperation were enhanced. The three service chiefs had the PM’s ears and confidence. The services were given the higher directions for war, and operational planning and execution were left to them. Geopolitical developments, mainly in the US’s rapprochement with China, made Pakistan indispensable to the USA. Thus, despite overwhelming evidence of the grave situation perpetrated by Pakistan, including that presented by Mrs Gandhi during her visit to the USA and by the press, Indian pleas found the then-US administration cold. By entering into a treaty with the Soviet Union, India effectively addressed any potential Chinese misadventure. The Arthashastra lays importance on negotiations and advises prudence in the use of force, with war as the last resort. Kautilyan realism also implies that when all else has failed, the ruler should not hesitate to apply hard power, if required when national interests dictate. The Indian playbook during that tumultuous period was exactly that.

At the sharp end of India’s strategy spear were the Army, Navy and IAF. Ably led by their competent chiefs, General (later Field Marshal) Sam Maneckshaw, Admiral SM Nanda and Air Chief Marshal PC Lal, respectively, the services knew exactly what to do and how to do it. Joint planning for operations was given due importance, and the period before the war was gainfully utilised for ‘work-up’ and building the required fighting wherewithal. Field commanders were given clear-cut tasks and operational freedom to execute them. Admiral Nanda convinced the political leadership of the need for the Navy’s participation in the war. The IAF, despite a creditable performance in 1965, had learned some hard lessons- all of which were duly addressed- and was raring to fire their guns in anger. In East Pakistan, the IAF quickly achieved air superiority and ruled the skies with impunity. PNS Ghazi, a submarine and pride of the Pakistan Navy, was sunk off the coast of Visakhapatnam and INS Vikrant, with its complement of Seahawk and Alize aircraft, wreaked havoc on the enemy. The military genius of Lt Gen Sagat Singh and the daredevilry of IAF helicopter pilots ensured the mighty Meghna River was crossed swiftly. The IAF and Army jointly carried out the most successful airborne assault post-World War II, at Tangail by para-dropping 2 Para, who captured the Poongli bridge and speedily linked up with 1 Maratha Light Infantry (1 MLI). In the West, too, the Indian Armed Forces proved their mettle. Notable actions included the naval and IAF strikes on Karachi, the battles of Basantar and Longewala, the gallant air action in defending Srinagar and the innovative use of An-12 for carpet bombing. The speed and alacrity of operations in East Pakistan ensured our forces swiftly reached Dacca, surprising the Pakistani army and their international benefactors. The final nail in the coffin was struck when IAF attacked the Government House on 14 December, and Maj Gen JFR Jacob ‘convinced’ Lt Gen Niazi to sign the Instrument of Surrender.

Apart from the Armed Forces, crucial in our victory in 1971 were R&AW, BSF, Assam Police (who also trained the Mukti Bahini), Railways and the foreign ministry. Each played their role to near perfection. Perhaps the most under-acknowledged and vital role was that of the Mukti Bahini. In less than a decade since the war with China, India had well and truly redeemed itself. It stood up against not one but three nations, including a superpower. Chinese veto in the United Nations and refusal to recognise Bangladesh made no difference to the ground reality. In fighting a ‘just war,’ giving credit to the Mukti Bahini, ensuring timely exit from Bangladesh and honourably treating the Pakistani Prisoners of War (PoW), India held high moral ground. The absence of jingoism and sycophancy allowed the Armed Forces to function professionally and successfully. Mrs Indira Gandhi exhibited pragmatic statecraft, led the nation effectively and yet was effusive in her praise of the Armed Forces and support of our citizens. The speech by Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee (who was in the opposition) in Parliament praising the leadership of Mrs Gandhi was a great example of democratic ideals and values.

Since the war, much has changed. Bangladesh has come a long way from a per capita GDP of around $ 91 in 1972 to $ 2730 in 2022 (an almost 29 times increase). Contrast this with Pakistan, whose per capita GDP in 1972 was $ 151 and has shown only a 10-fold increase to $ 1597 in 2022. While Bangladesh is one of the fastest-growing economies, Pakistan has spiralled into an abyss of economic misery, social chaos, violence, radicalisation, and strife. Its use of religion in statecraft has miserably failed. Some believe that India should have settled the Kashmir issue by force in 1971 and have criticised India’s apparent ‘soft’ stand. These people may not have read ‘Pure Strategy’ by Everett Carl Dolman, who, in Chapter 2, presciently states that “overreaching in war is the costliest strategic mistake”. Indian statecraft had recognised this important aspect in 1971, much before Dolman published his book in 2005. Indian statecraft also avoided giving a religious twist to the events in 1971, instead rightly focusing on the humanitarian angle. Even under adverse conditions, our core value of plurality was not compromised. This ‘Vijay Diwas’ is an apt occasion to remember and acknowledge the statesmanship of the national leadership and valour of the Army, Navy, and IAF, who shaped a great strategic victory in 1971. Equally important is to remember the values on which this war was fought and ensure our uncompromising adherence to those.

The writer is a former IAF officer and writes on defence matters, strategic affairs and geopolitics. He can be reached [email protected]

Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal and do not reflect the official position or policyof Financial Express Online. Reproducing this content without permission is prohibited.

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